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This paper extends the widely used ordered choice model by introducing stochastic thresholds and
interval-specific outcomes. The model can be interpreted as a generalization of the GAFT (MPH) framework
for discrete duration data that jointly models durations and outcomes associated with different stopping
times. We establish conditions for nonparametric identification. We interpret the ordered choice model
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Throughout his career, Daniel McFadden has stressed the importance of economic theory in
formulating and interpreting econometric models. He has also stressed the value of stating the
exact conditions under which an econometric model is identi¯ed. The best known example of
his approach is his analysis of discrete choice (1974; 1981), but there are other examples (e.g.
Fuss and McFadden, 1978). In some of his earliest work (1963), he exposited the implicit
economic assumptions used by Theil in the Rotterdam model of consumer demand.2
This paper continues the McFadden tradition by examining the economic foundations of
the widely used ordered discrete choice model. We extend this model to allow for thresh-
olds that depend on observables and unobservables to jointly analyze discrete choices and
associated choice outcomes and to accommodate uncertainty at the agent level.
Ordered choice models arise in many areas of economics. Goods can sometimes be de-
¯ned in terms of their quality as measured along a one-dimensional spectrum. In this case,
consumer choice of a good can be modeled as the choice of an interval of the quality spec-
trum (Bresnahan, 1987; Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). Schooling
choices are often modeled using an ordered choice model (see, e.g. Machin and Vignoles,
2005). Cameron and Heckman (1998) present an economic analysis that justi¯es the appli-
cation of the ordered choice model to schooling choices and a proof of the semiparametric
identi¯cation of their model.3
In the analysis of taxation and labor supply with kinked convex constraints, choices of
intervals of hours of work and segments of the consumer's budget set are often modeled using
ordered choice models (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1981). Ordered choice models encompass a
widely used class of duration models. Ridder (1990) established the equivalence of the con-
ventional ordered choice model and GAFT (Generalized Accelerated Failure Time) models
2Theil's work is summarized in his collected papers on consumer demand (1975,1976).
3Our model generalizes Cameron and Heckman (1998) by allowing the cuto®s or thresholds that de¯ne
the ordered choice model to depend on regressors and unobservables. We also establish that the ordered
choice model can represent forward looking economic models, contrary to claims made by those authors.
1for discrete time duration data which include the MPH (Mixed Proportional Hazard) model
as a special case.
The conventional ordered choice model is assumed to be additively separable in observ-
ables (Z) and in unobservables (UI) and is generated by an index
(1) I = '(Z) + UI
where the observed-unobserved distinction is made from the point of view of the econome-
trician. UI is a mean zero scalar random variable that is assumed to be independent of





if the index lies between certain threshold or cuto® values cs, which are as-
sumed to be constants. We let D(s) = 1 if the agent chooses S = s. Cuto®s cs are ordered
so that cs · cs+1; s = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1. In this notation, the ordered choice model can be written
as
(2) D(1) = 1(I · c1);:::;D(s) = 1(cs¡1 < I · cs);:::;D(¹ S) = 1(c¹ S¡1 < I),
where c¹ S = 1. The de¯ning feature of the classical ordered choice model is that choices are
generated by ordered sections of the support of a scalar latent continuous random variable
I (e.g. durations or hours of work).5
In a number of contexts, it is plausible that the cuto® values di®er among persons depend-
ing on variables that cannot be observed by the econometrician. In an analysis of taxation
and labor supply, the locations of the kink points of the budget set, cs, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1,
depends on assets and exemptions to which the agent is entitled. These may not be fully
observable, especially if wages or assets are imputed.6 In an analysis of schooling, there may
4If I¤ = g(Z;UI), there may exist one or more monotonic transformations h, such that h(I¤) = I =
'(Z) + UI. The conventional approach works with this representation.
5Separability of the index in Z and UI as in (1) is a secondary requirement, but is a part of the speci¯cation
of the classical ordered choice model.
6This problem is discussed by Heckman and MaCurdy (1981) and Heckman (1983).
2be grade-speci¯c subsidies and genuine grade-speci¯c uncertainty at the agent level arising
from learning about abilities and labor market shocks. Uncertainty is an essential feature of
job search models.
To capture these possibilities, Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) generalize the or-
dered choice model by allowing the cuto®s cs to depend on (a) state-s-speci¯c regressors
(Qs) and (b) variables unobserved by the econometrician (´s).7 The thresholds are written
as cs(Qs;´s). To preserve the separability of the classical ordered choice model, we assume
that cs(Qs;´s) = cs(Qs)+´s, s = 1;:::; ¹ S. We array the Qs into a vector Q = (Q1;:::;Q¹ S).
Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) adjoin systems of both discrete and continuous out-
comes associated with the choice of each state, s = 1;:::; ¹ S.
This paper builds on their analysis. We develop conditions for nonparametric identi-
¯cation of ordered choice models with stochastic thresholds and associated outcomes that
are applicable to a variety of economic problems. We consider classes of economic models
that can be represented by the ordered choice model. We also develop the restrictions on
information processing and the arrival of new information that are required to produce a
separable-in-observables-and-unobservables ordered choice duration model with stochastic
thresholds that can be used to analyze dynamic discrete choices and associated outcomes.
We generate the ordered choice model from an index of marginal returns. The marginal
returns must be monotone across the ordered states to preserve the structure of the ordered
choice model. The unobservables must satisfy a stochastic monotonicity property. More
formally, we de¯ne the generalized ordered choice model by extending (2) to:
(3) D(s) = 1(cs¡1(Qs¡1) + ´s¡1 · '(Z) + UI · cs(Qs) + ´s); s = 1;:::; ¹ S;
where c0(Q0) = ¡1, c¹ S (Q¹ S) = 1, and ´0 = ´¹ S = 0. When the ´s, s = 1;:::; ¹ S, are non-
degenerate, they can absorb UI (i.e., setting UI = 0 is innocuous). The model is separable
7See Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003, footnote 23). This model is also discussed in Heckman,
LaLonde and Smith (1999). For a recent analysis of this model and its relationship to the treatment e®ect
literature, see Vytlacil (2006).
3in terms of observables (functions of Qs, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1) and the unobservables (UI, ´s,
s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1). For this representation to be probabilistically meaningful, it is required
that the upper and lower limits on '(Z) + UI be ordered across all choices. We call this
property stochastic monotonicity and we de¯ne it in assumption (A-1), where we condition
on Q = q and Z = z:
(A-1) Pr(cs(qs¡1) + ´s¡1 ¡ '(z) ¡ UI · cs(qs) + ´s ¡ '(z) ¡ UI j Q = q;Z = z) = 1,
for all s = 1;:::; ¹ S.8
Assumption (A-1) de¯nes ordered stochastic intervals that replace the non-stochastic inter-
vals assumed in (2). (A-1) ensures that probabilities associated with the events characterized
by (3) sum to one and are non-negative. (A-1) is a coherency condition for ordered choice
models. This paper analyzes an array of well de¯ned economic models that can be charac-
terized by (3) and (A-1).
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents four ordered choice models to
demonstrate the range of economic phenomena that the ordered choice model can capture.
The ¯rst is a model under perfect certainty for the choice of goods when qualities are het-
erogeneous. A version of this model can be used to analyze labor supply in the presence
of discontinuous tax schedules. The second is a prototypical model of discrete choice under
perfect certainty. The third is a model of agent decision making under uncertainty with
sequential revision of information. Section 3 establishes conditions for nonparametric identi-
¯cation of the generalized ordered choice model. Section 4 discusses identi¯cation of ordered
choice models with adjoined state-speci¯c outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
8An alternative and equivalent formulation is that
(A-1)0 Pr(cs(qs¡1) + ´s¡1 · cs(qs) + ´s j Q = q;Z = z) = 1 for all s = 1;:::; ¹ S,
where the conditioning on Z is redundant for this condition, but we maintain it to unify the notation in this
paper.
42 Ordered Choice Models
Let \s" denote a state generated by some latent variable falling in an interval. The latent
variable can be an index associated with di®erent lengths of durations as it falls into di®erent
segments of an underlying continuum as in the GAFT model of Ridder (1990). \s" can be a
stage in a process or a quality interval that de¯nes a good as in Prescott and Visscher (1977),
Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Bresnahan (1987). It can also represent intervals of hours of
work as in Heckman (1974) and Heckman and MaCurdy (1981). Schooling with ¹ S stages
is another example where the latent index is a marginal return function. The framework is
general and can be used to model the choice of the time at which a drug is taken or the date
(stage) at which a machine is installed. We present four examples. One is a model for the
choice of di®erentiated goods. The second is a version of the deterministic Wicksell (1934)
capital model applied to the cutting of a tree. The third is a stochastic tree cutting problem.
The fourth is an optimal schooling model that captures the essential features of the model
of Keane and Wolpin (1997).
2.1 Choice of Di®erentiated Goods
Following the analysis of Prescott and Visscher (1977), let ¿i be consumer i's marginal
valuation of quality X. Goods come in discrete packages with quality Xg and price Pg,
g = 1;:::;G. A quality-price bundle (Xg;Pg) de¯nes a good. Consumers can buy at most
one unit of the good. Bundles are ordered so that Xg+1 > Xg and Pg+1 > Pg. Assume that
all of the goods are purchased in equilibrium. Consumer preferences are over X and the rest
of consumption M:
U(Xg;M) = ¿iXg + M:
For income Y , if a person buys good g at price Pg, M = Y ¡ Pg.
5Consumer i is indi®erent between two goods g + 1 and g if
Xg+1¿i ¡ Pg+1 = Xg¿i ¡ Pg:





The \cuto® value" cg has the interpretation of the marginal price per unit quality. If cg <
¿i · cg+1, the consumer buys good g + 1. As an equilibrium condition, the marginal price
of quality must be nondecreasing in the level of quality. If there are some agents at each
margin of indi®erence, an ordered choice model is generated with these threshold values.
In the notation of the ordered choice model, Ii = ¿i, cs =
Ps+1¡Ps
Xs+1¡Xs, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, and
the goods are ordered by their price per unit quality. The demand function in terms of ¿
is generated as the envelope of ¿Xg ¡ Pg, g = 1;:::;G.9 The cuto®s may depend on both
observed and unobserved variables. Prices may depend on the characteristics of the buyer.
Quality may be measured with error so the thresholds may be stochastic.
In the analysis of taxes and labor supply (Heckman, 1974; Heckman and MaCurdy,
1981), the ordered choice model arises as the natural econometric framework for analyzing
labor supply in the presence of progressive taxation associated with di®erent tax brackets
at di®erent levels of earnings. Cuto®s correspond to points of discontinuity of the tax
schedule that are determined by exemptions and asset levels, and that may be only partially
observed by the econometrician. We next develop a stopping time example which is a vehicle
for introducing uncertainty into the framework of the ordered choice model and thereby
extending it. We begin by developing the case of perfect certainty. This is a version of a
tree cutting problem, originally analyzed by Wicksell (1934) and applied to the analysis of
human capital by Rosen (1977).
9One good might have zero price at zero quality.
62.2 An Optimal Stopping Model Under Perfect Certainty
Let S = s denote the individual's choice of stopping time, where s 2 f1;:::; ¹ Sg. Let R(s;X)
denote the discounted net lifetime reward associated with stopping at stage s, where the
discounting is done at the end of period s. An example would be a model of the choice of
schooling s where each schooling level is assumed to take one year and the opportunity cost
of schooling is the foregone earnings.10






where r is the interest rate and R(s;X) is the reward from stopping at stage s. The value
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general case, an individual will stop at stage s if R(s;X) ¸
V (s+1;X)
1+r . For the agent to reach
stage s, it is required that R(s ¡ 1;X) <
V (s;X)
1+r . This rule produces the global optimum.
An ordered choice model representation of the general choice problem can be written when
pairwise comparisons of returns R(s;X) across adjacent states characterize the optimum and





¡ R(s ¡ 1;X):
Assuming concavity, i.e.
(A-2) the marginal return function f(s;X) is nonincreasing in s for all X,
the optimum for the general problem is characterized by s = s¤ if and only if f(s¤ +1;X) ·
0 · f(s¤;X). The optimum is unique if the weak inequality on the left of zero is replaced
by a strict inequality.
10Agents pay a ¯xed cost C (s;X) after completing each grade of school and R(s;X) is the reward to
schooling net of these costs. When C (s;X) = 0, the agent's only costs are foregone earnings. This model
includes both Card's (1999) and Rosen's (1977) versions of Becker's Woytinsky Lecture (1967). We work
with present values of earnings associated with schooling states and Card works with annualized returns.
7The general rule for locating the optimum s¤ is
V (s¤ + 1;X)
1 + r
¡ R(s





Because of the concavity assumed in (A-2), one can replace V (s¤;X) and V (s¤¡1;X) in these
expressions with R(s¤;X) and R(s¤ ¡ 1;X), respectively. We now introduce unobservables
into the model. With additional separability assumptions about the unobservables, (A-1)
and (A-2) produce the conventional ordered choice model.
2.2.1 Introducing unobservables into the model
Unobservables are introduced into the model in two distinct ways. Both preserve additive-
separability-in-unobservables that is a de¯ning feature of the conventional ordered choice
model. First, we introduce a scalar random variable UI representing an invariant individual-
speci¯c shifter of the net gain function that is observed and acted on by the individual but
is not observed by the econometrician.11 Second, there may be transition-speci¯c regres-
sors that determine the net return (e.g. tuition in a schooling model), some of which are
unobserved.
For the optimal stopping model de¯ned in the preceding section to be represented by
separable ordered choice model (3), we need to invoke separability in the marginal return
function f (s;X) in addition to monotonicity in s.
(A-3) Assume that the marginal return depends on individual characteristics where f(s +
1;X) =
R(s+1;X)
1+r ¡ R(s;X) = ¡(cs(Qs) + ´s) + '(Z) + UI, s 2 f1;:::; ¹ Sg, where X =
(Q1;:::;Q¹ S¡1;Z), and E(UI) = 0. The Z variables are common across all states, s =
1;:::; ¹ S. The Qs are the state-speci¯c arguments of R(s+1;X) and R(s;X), and components
of X are observed. The ´s are unobservables from the point of view of the econometrician.
The ´s and the cs(Qs) can be interpreted as cost shocks. Under (A-3), the choice of schooling
11Such invariant random variables are sometimes called components of \heterogeneity" in the literature.
8level s is characterized by (3). The cuto®s must satisfy the stochastic monotonicity assump-
tion. This restriction imposes constraints on the model that are not present in standard
discrete choice models. The traditional ordered choice model treats the cs(Qs) as constants
and sets ´j ´ 0, j = 1;:::; ¹ S.
It is fruitful to compare this model with a general discrete choice model with net rewards
for choice s written as
R(s;X) = ¹R(s;X) ¡ "(s); s = 1;:::; ¹ S;
where preference shocks satisfy "(s) ? ? X for all s, where \? ?" denotes independence condi-







In the general model, the states are unordered. In the ordered choice specialization of this
model,
f(s;X) = R(s;X)¡R(s¡1;X) = ¹R(s;X)¡¹R(s¡1;X)¡("(s)¡"(s¡1));s = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1;
where '(Z) in equation (3) consists of components of ¹R(s;X) ¡ ¹R(s ¡ 1;X) that are
functionally independent of s, and ¡cs(Qs) are the components of ¹R(s;X) ¡ ¹R(s ¡ 1;X)
that are (s ¡ 1;s)-speci¯c and ´s ¡ UI = "(s) ¡ "(s ¡ 1). These shocks can be interpreted
as either negative marginal return shocks or as marginal cost shocks added to gross returns.
Condition (A-1) restricts the admissible shocks in a general discrete choice model to satisfy
the ordered discrete choice condition for X = x:
(OD) Pr(cj+1(qj+1) ¡ cj(qj) ¸ 2"(j) ¡ "(j ¡ 1) ¡ "(j + 1) j X = x) = 1:12
9This condition is testable because Matzkin (1994) and Heckman and Navarro (2007) show,
under di®erent assumptions, that the general multinomial choice model is nonparametrically
identi¯ed, so that it is possible to identify the joint distribution of the "(s), s = 1;:::; ¹ S up
to pairwise contrasts, and the cj(qj), j = 1;:::; ¹ S up to pairwise contrasts.13
In this speci¯cation, agents are assumed to be making choices in an atemporal set-
ting. They draw shocks "(s) across all states, s = 1;:::; ¹ S, subject to condition (OD)
and maximize their utility. In section 3, we establish conditions under which this model is
nonparametrically identi¯ed.
The ordered choice model is a version of the mixed proportional hazards for discrete
durations (Ridder, 1990), which is widely used in applied work on unemployment and other
dynamic outcomes. It is thus of interest to examine whether the ordered choice model
can be modi¯ed to capture the sequential arrival of information under uncertainty. We
generalize the analysis of this section to account for uncertainty and agent information
updating. Additional assumptions are required to justify the ordered choice framework of
this section as a well-de¯ned economic model for the analysis of uncertain environments in
which agents update their information about their future choices.
2.3 Adding Sequential Revelation of Information
This section extends the ordered choice model under certainty to a model with period-
speci¯c shocks that are not known by the agents in advance. We consider a prototypical
tree-cutting problem which motivates economically richer models. We give conditions under
which the ordered choice framework accurately captures the economic model. In section 2.4
we generalize our analysis to a model that is a version of the general framework of Keane
and Wolpin (1997).
Let Lt denote the length of a tree t periods after it is planted. Lt+1 = (1¡½)¹ L+½Lt+"t+1,
12Recall that X contains both Q and Z components.
13Crawford, Pollak and Vella (1998) analyze restrictions on the derivatives of ordered logit and general
logit choice models for an ordered logit model with nonstochastic thresholds that do not depend on the
regressors.
10where E ("t+1 j Lt) = 0, ¡1 < ½ < 1, and ¹ L is the steady state mean.14 Assume that the
agent has to decide when to cut the tree. The agent has a ¯nite number of periods to make
this decision. Thus, if the agent does not cut the tree by the end of period T, he loses the
right to cut the tree and his payo® is zero. If the individual cuts the tree in period t(· T),
he collects Lt, where we assume that the price of one foot of lumber is unity in each period.
The individual may decide not to cut the tree, and keep the option of selling it tomorrow
when it may be a little longer. As in Wicksell's (1934) model, the opportunity cost of not
cutting the tree is generated by the foregone interest, which accumulates at a deterministic
rate r. We may write the value function of the individual at stage t as







if t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1 (4)
V (LT) = LT.
The agent will always cut the tree. If by the last period he has not yet cut the tree, it is
always preferable to cut the tree rather than to forego the right to do so. Assume that the




E [Lt+1jLt] ¡ Lt ·
1
1 + r
E [LtjLt¡1] ¡ Lt¡1.
Condition (5) guarantees that the stochastic monotonicity condition (A-1) is satis¯ed. Thus,
this problem can be econometrically formulated as an ordered choice model with stochastic
thresholds.
Consider an agent who at the beginning of period ¿ = 1;:::;T ¡ 1 is contemplat-
ing whether to cut the tree or not. If 1
1+rE [L¿+1jL¿] ¡ L¿ > 0 he should not cut the







E [Lt+1jLt] · E [V (Lt+1)jLt] so that Lt < 1
1+rE [Lt+1jLt] · 1
1+rE [V (Lt+1)jLt] and
14Our version of the tree cutting problem is closely related to the case discussed by Brock et al. (1989),
who analyze a model with a random walk error term. Our model is stationary in tree lengths and their
model is nonstationary in tree lengths, but stationary in present values.






1+rE [V (Lt+1)jLt]. If, on the other hand,
1
1+rE [L¿+1jL¿] ¡ L¿ · 0, the agent should cut the tree. To see why, consider the value
function in the next to last period. By de¯nition,








The ¯rst equality arises because in the last period, V (LT) = LT. The second equality arises
because if t < T ¡1 and 1
1+rE [Lt+1jLt]¡Lt · 0, then 1
1+rE [LTjLT¡1]¡LT · 0 is implied
by (5). Proceeding by backward induction, at period ¿ we have















The second equality shows that we can write the problem of the agent using a one stage look
ahead rule substituting the conditional expectation of the value function E [V (Lt+1)jLt] by
the conditional expectation of the length of the tree, E [Lt+1jLt].15
The agent cuts the tree at the period ¿ = 1;:::;T ¡ 1 that satis¯es
1
1 + r
E [L¿+1jL¿] ¡ L¿ · 0 and
1
1 + r




E [L¿+1jL¿] ¡ L¿ = '(Z) + UI ¡ c¿ (Q¿) ¡ ´¿,
it follows from (5) that
Pr(c¿(Qt) + ´¿ ¡ ('(Z) + UI) ¸ c¿¡1(Q¿¡1) + ´¿¡1 ¡ ('(Z) + UI) j Q = q;Z = z) = 1;
which is the stochastic monotonicity condition (A-1). Consequently, the tree-cutting problem
can be formulated as a generalized ordered choice model, and the tree is cut in period ¿ if
15Ferguson (2003) shows that the one step ahead rule is only optimal in monotone optimal stopping
problems.
12c¿¡1 (Qt) + ´¿¡1 · '(Z) + UI · c¿ (Q¿) + ´¿. We next consider a more general model of
dynamic discrete choice under uncertainty.
2.4 A Dynamic Schooling Choice Model
We next consider a richer dynamic model where individuals decide between two choices which
are stochastically updated. This is a two sector version of the general model estimated by
Keane and Wolpin (1997).16
Consider a model in which an individual with ability a at each period t decides whether
to enroll in school or not, where t = 1;:::;T. Instead of schooling, we can analyze other
types of discrete states in which agents decide to remain in the state 0 and then drop out
(e.g. a spell of training or a physical therapy program). We denote the current schooling
level of the individual by st; st = 1;:::; ¹ S. Let dt = 0 if the agent decides not to enroll
in school in period t and dt = 1 otherwise. If an agent with schooling level s does not
enroll in school, he works full time and increases his schooling-sector-s speci¯c experience
by one unit. If the same agent decides to enroll in school, he works part time, but does not
accumulate experience. In each period t and at each schooling level s; let xs;t 2 <+ denote the







denote the vector of accumulated experience in all schooling sectors s = 1;:::; ¹ S. It simpli¯es
notation to de¯ne the vector es;t 2 <
¹ S
+ and vector ¹ xs;t 2 <
¹ S
+ as es;t = (0;:::;1;:::;0) and
¹ xs;t = (0;:::;xs;t;:::;0) = xs;tes;t, respectively.
If the individual decides not to enroll in school in period t, he works full time and has
earnings r0 (t;s;xs;t;a) which depends on schooling level s; accumulated experience by period
t in sector s; xs;t; and ability a: If the individual decides to enroll in school in period t his
earnings are r1 (t;s;xs;t;a). We assume that the earnings functions rk (t;s;xs;t;a); k = 0;1;
satisfy the following conditions:
16Keane and Wolpin do not consider nonparametric identi¯cation of their model.
13(A-4) (A) r0 (t;s;xs;t;a) = ®(s;a)+°xs;t +¢r0 (t;s;xs;t); where ¢r0 (t;s;xs;t) is unknown
from the point of view of the agent at all periods ¿ < t: We assume that ° ¸ 0.
(B) r1 (t;s;xs;t;a) = ± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s;xs;t); where ¢r1 (t;s;xs;t) is unknown from the
point of view of the agent at all periods ¿ < t:
(C) For every s; a: ®(s + 1;a) ¸ ®(s;a):
(D) For every s; a: ®(s + 1;a) ¡ ®(s;a) · ®(s;a) ¡ ®(s ¡ 1;a);
(E) For every s;a: ®(s;a) ¸ 0. If a0 ¸ a then ®(s;a0) ¸ ®(s;a);
(F) For every a; ®






(G) For every s; a: ®(s;a) ¡ ± (s;a) ¸ 0;
(H) For every t;s;xt;a: Pr[¢r0 (t;s;xs;t) ¡ ¢r1 (t;s;xs;t) · ± (s;a) ¡ ®(s;a)] = 0:








t; ¹ S;x¹ S;t
¢¢
:
We assume that ¢r(t) is independent from ¢r(t0) for t 6= t0;
Conditions (A) and (B) state that the earnings functions rk (t;s;xs;t;a) are linear and
separable in schooling and experience. This speci¯cation is commonly invoked in labor eco-
nomics (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1997, or Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2006a). The
stochastic components are also assumed to be separable from the deterministic components.
However, we do not require s and a to be separable. To maintain mathematical tractability
and to simplify the argument, we assume the \Mincer" model that assumes that the experi-
ence pro¯les are parallel|that is, that °s = ° for all s. For simplicity, we also assume that
the earnings of the agents enrolled in school do not depend on their work experience. The
\Mincer" assumptions can be relaxed at the cost of greater notational complexity.
Condition (C) states that ®(s;a) is increasing in schooling s for all ability levels a: From
Condition (D), the marginal returns to schooling, ®(s + 1;a) ¡ ®(s;a) are decreasing in
schooling, for all ability levels a. Condition (E) says that ®(s;a) is increasing in ability a
for all schooling levels s: Condition (F) states that the returns to school above maximum
schooling level ¹ S are nonpositive for all levels of ability a. Conditions (G) and (H) impose
the requirement that the current opportunity costs of attending school are non-negative.
14Assuming that the agent starts with schooling level s0 and accumulated experience x0,
the individual is assumed to maximize the following criterion:








¿¡1 [d¿r1 (¿;s¿;xs¿;¿;a) + (1 ¡ d¿)r0 (¿;s¿;xs¿;¿;a)]




s0 = 0;x0 = 0;
s¿+1 = s¿ + d¿;
xs¿+1;¿+1 = xs¿+1;¿+1 + 1 if d¿ = 0;
xs¿;¿+1 = xs¿;¿ if d¿ = 1:
Consider an agent in period t who has accumulated a total of s years of schooling and
experience vector xt: Let zt =
¡
x1;t;:::;xs;t + 1;:::;x¹ S;t
¢
: We can write the problem of the
agent recursively as
(6)




®(s;a) + °xs;t + ¢r0 (t;s;xs;t) + ¯E [V (t + 1;s;zt;a)js;xt;a];





The agent decides to enroll in school, dt = 1; if and only if
n




¯E [V (t + 1;s;zt;a) ¡ V (t + 1;s;xt;a)js;xt;a]
o
· ¯E [V (t + 1;s + 1;xt;a) ¡ V (t + 1;s;xt;a)js;xt;a]:
The left-hand side of the inequality has two components in braces that represent the costs
of enrolling in school. The ¯rst is the foregone earnings of being enrolled in school, which
is nonnegative according to Conditions (G) and (H) of (A-4). The second term in braces
15arises from returns to investment. If the agent decides to enroll in school today he will not
collect the higher pay associated with work experience he accumulates if he decides not to
enroll in school. The opportunity cost of enrolling in school is the current earnings foregone
plus the future return to current work experience. The future bene¯ts, which appear on the
right-hand side, arise from higher levels of education. The agent decides to enroll in school
if the net bene¯t is positive.
In general, the solution to the dynamic schooling choice model may involve dropping out
of school for some periods to take advantage of favorable labor market conditions. Note that
if there are T periods, there are a total of 2T possible paths. The solution of the model is
obtained by generating a set of decision rules fd¤
t (st;It)g
T
¿=1 by backward induction.
2.4.1 Su±cient Conditions for the Ordered Choice Model of Schooling to Rep-
resent the Stochastic Dynamic Schooling Choice Model.
As shown in our analysis of the tree-cutting problem, the ordered choice model can sometimes
represent an optimal stopping problem. This is not always true in a general stochastic
dynamic schooling choice model, where agents may drop out of school and return at a later
date. The ¯rst step required to justify an ordered choice model in this more general setup is
to obtain conditions that guarantee that if the agent ¯nds it optimal not to enroll in school
at date t, i.e dt = 0; then he will also ¯nd it optimal not to return, so that d¿ = 0 for any
¿ > t. We establish a series of propositions that justify application of the ordered choice
model.
Proposition 1. Under conditions (D) and (F) of (A-4), for each ability level a there exists
a schooling level s¤ (a) such that:
®(s
¤ (a) + 1;a) ¡ ®(s
¤ (a);a) · °:
Proof. This is a consequence of the assumption that ®(s;a) is concave in s and that for all
16a; ®






Proposition 2. Under (A-4), for any ability level a, schooling level s ¸ s¤ (a); experience
vector ¹ xs;t; and period t ¸ s¤ (a) :





¿¡tr0 (¿;s;xs;t + ¿ ¡ t;a)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s; ¹ xs;t;a
#





¿¡t [®(s;a) + ° (xs;t + ¿ ¡ t)] + ¢r0 (t;s;xs;t)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From this proposition it follows that the value of the program after s¤(a) is just the present
value of earnings in the no schooling state. This proposition implies the following useful
corollary.
Corollary 1. (To Proposition 2). Under (A-4), if the agent reaches school level s¤ (a) at
some period t < T; then at period t, he drops out of school with s¤ (a) years of education
and he never returns to school at any period ¿ = t + 1;::::;T. ¤
We next analyze the behavior of an agent with schooling level s < s¤ (a). To do so, we
impose the following additional assumption that guarantees that the returns to experience
grow faster than the returns to education:
(A-5) (Entrapment): For any school level s = 1;:::; ¹ S and ability level a;
®(s + k;a) ¡ ®(s;a) · (k + 1)°;
where k is a nonnegative integer.
This condition, joined with (A-4), allows us to simplify the value function, as we record in
the next proposition.
17Proposition 3. Under (A-4) and (A-5), at every period t, schooling level s such that s¤ (a) =
s + k (a); k (a) ¸ 0; for persons with experience vector xt = 0 (no work experience up to t),





> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
¢r0 (t;s;0) +
PT
¿=t ¯¿¡t [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t)];
± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s) + ¯
PT
¿=t+1 ¯¿¡t¡1 [®(s + 1;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t ¡ 1)];
. . .
Pk(a)¡1
l=1 ¯l¡1± (s + l;a) + ¢r1 (t;s) + ¯k(a) PT
¿=t+k(a) ¯¿¡t¡k(a) [®(s¤ (a);a) + ° (¿ ¡ t ¡ k(a))]
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. (To Proposition 3). Under (A-4) and (A-5), at every period t, schooling level
s such that s¤ (a) = s + k (a); k (a) ¸ 0; experience vector xt = 0; and ability level a, if the
agent decides to drop out of school at period t with schooling level s, he/she never returns to
school.
De¯ne the expected reward to permanently dropping out at schooling level s at time t as




¿¡t [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t)]:
Under (A-4) and (A-5), we can rewrite the value function in this notation as
V (t;s;0;a) = maxfR(t;s;0;a);± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s;0) + ¯Et [V (t + 1;s + 1;0;a)]g:
We have just shown that under our assumptions, for any period t, schooling level s, experience
xt, and ability level a, once the agent leaves school he never returns. The optimal schooling
18problem is an optimal stopping problem. Note that if R(t;s;0;a) · ± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s;0) +
¯Et [R(t + 1;s + 1;0;a)] then the agent would not leave school. This is a straightforward
consequence of Proposition (2), which establishes that E [R(t + 1;s + 1;0;a)] · Et [V (t + 1;s + 1;0;a)].
Note that if we normalize the variables in a way that the ¯rst period is \1" and the ¯rst
schooling level is also \1", then an agent who never drops out of school and advances one
grade per period will reach schooling level \s" at period \s."
Assumptions (A-4) and (A-5) guarantee that the dynamic discrete choice model is an
optimal stopping model. They are not enough to deliver an ordered choice model represen-
tation. Additional assumptions are required. We invoke the following additional assumption
(A-6):
(A-6) For any schooling level s and ability a :
®(s + k;a) ¡ ± (s + k;a) ¸
1 ¡ ¯T¡s¡k




¢r0 (s + k;s + k;0) ¡ ¢r1 (s + k;s + k;0) ¸
1 ¡ ¯T¡s¡k
1 ¡ ¯T¡s ¢r0 (s;s;0) ¡ ¢r1 (s;s;0)
¶
= 1:
These conditions ensure that the schooling problem is a monotone optimal stopping problem
as de¯ned in Ferguson (2003). In a monotone optimal stopping problem, local comparisons
of returns generate globally optimal choices. We establish the following claim:
Proposition 4. Under (A-4){(A-6), dynamic discrete schooling choice model is a monotone
optimal stopping problem.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Under (A-4){(A-6) we can solve the global optimization problem by making local or one
stage ahead comparisons:
19Proposition 5. Under (A-4)-(A-6), we can write the value function of the dynamic discrete
schooling choice model as
V (t;s;0;a) = maxfR(t;s;0;a);± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s;0) + ¯Et [R(t + 1;s + 1;0;a)]g.
Proof. This is true because for monotone optimal stopping problems, the one stage look
ahead rule is optimal. For a proof, see Ferguson (2003).
We now collect the results established in this section on conditions on a general dynamic
discrete choice model that justify the ordered choice model.
Theorem 1. Under (A-4) { (A-6), the dynamic discrete schooling choice model can be















[¢r0 (s;s;0) ¡ ¢r1 (s;s;0)]:
To show that it satis¯es stochastic monotonicity, by the de¯nition of Cs (Qs) and ´s, together
with (A-6), we have for any s = 1;:::; ¹ S :
Cs (Qs) + ´s · Cs+1 (Qs+1) + ´s+1
and hence (A-1) is satis¯ed.17
17In addition to the shocks associated with uncertainty at the agent level, we can add components of
heterogeneity known to the agent but not observed by the econometrician. UI can be interpreted as such
a component. Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) analyze mixture
versions of the ordered choice model. See the analysis in section 3 below.
20We next consider some simple examples to illustrate the various economic models analyzed
in this paper.
2.5 A Three Period Example
A three period (schooling level) example helps to ¯x ideas developed for di®erent models.
Suppose that the reward function associated with each schooling level can be written as
R(1) = ¹1(X) + "(1); R(2) = ¹2(X) + "(2); R(3) = ¹3(X) + "(3):
Assume no discounting. A standard discrete choice model postulates that the agent draws
" = ("(1);"(2);"(3)) and s = argmaxjfR(j)g3
j=1. There is no restriction on the "(j), j =
1;2;3. The ordered choice model applied to this setting imposes the restriction (OD) given
in section 2.2.1.
Next, we take the same reward functions but use them in a simple version of the sequential
dynamic discrete choice model with information updating developed in section 2.4. Agents
are assumed to choose among states, and states and periods are the same. Assume that
agents know X. The only uncertainty at the agent level is about the "(j). Let Ij denote the
agent's information set. In period i, the agent knows "(i) but not "(i0), i0 > i. The agent
stops at stage 1 if
¹1(X) ¡ "(1) > E [(¹2(X) ¡ "(2))1[¹2(X) ¡ "(2) > ¹3(X) ¡ E("(3) j I2)]
(9a)
+ (¹3(X) ¡ E("(3) j I2))1[¹2(X) ¡ "(2) · ¹3(X) ¡ E("(3) j I2)] j I1]:
The agent stops at stage 2 if the inequality is reversed in the previous expression and
(9b) ¹2(X) ¡ "(2) > ¹3(X) ¡ E("(3) j I2):
21The agent stops at stage 3 if the inequality is reversed in both previous expressions.
Observe that if the "(i) are independently distributed, as is assumed in Keane and Wolpin
(1997), the expression on the right-hand side of inequality (9a) can be written as
(¹2(X) ¡ E ["(2) j ¹2(X) ¡ "(2) > ¹3(X)])Pr(¹2(X) ¡ "(2) > ¹3(X))
+ ¹3(X)Pr(¹2(X) ¡ "(2) · ¹3(X)):
The right hand side of (9a) in this case does not depend on "(1) and is clearly separable in X
and "(1). Thus it is possible to represent this version of the dynamic discrete choice model
under uncertainty using the ordered choice model. However, the independence of the shocks
is crucial to this example. Suppose instead that "(2) and "(1) are dependent. Learning
about "(1) changes the expression on the right-hand side of equation (9a). In general, "(1) is
in the conditioning set on the right-hand side interacted with X (via ¹2(X) and ¹3(X)) and
is clearly on the left-hand side of the expression. This modi¯cation generates a fundamental
nonseparability in the unobservables of the model. A key requirement of the classical ordered
choice model is violated. If "(j) is a random walk
"(2) = !(2) + "(1); !(2) ? ? "(1)
"(3) = !(3) + "(2); !(3) ? ? "(2);
the expression on the right-hand side of (9a) simpli¯es, since E("(3) j I2) = "(2), so it can
be written as
(¹2(X) ¡ "(1)) 1(¹2(X) > ¹3(X)) + (¹3(X) ¡ "(1)) 1(¹2(X) > ¹3(X));
which is clearly nonseparable in "(1), X. However, the optimal decision does not depend on
"(2) and "(3).
These examples illustrate the sensitivity of the stochastic structure of the choice model
22to the speci¯cation of agent information sets and learning rules. As developed in section 2.4,
the requirements built into decision rules (9a) and (9b) that a person who drops out cannot
return to a state, is sometimes arti¯cial. For example, if at the end of period 3, suppose
that the agent who has dropped out in a previous period gets a very favorable draw of "(3).
Suppose that there is recall. Since "(1), "(2), "(3) are known at the end of the period, the
agent will be back in a static decision world. He could optimally return to school. This
possibility is ruled out in the ordered choice model, but it arises in a variety of dynamic
discrete choice models in economics.18
However, there are many events where reentry is not possible, e.g., a person can die
only once, a company can only be founded once. For these and other examples, the ordered
choice model is a useful framework. Even for events that are not irreversible, after a stage,
irreversibility may characterize the generating process and the ordered choice model may
adequately characterize it.
2.6 Summary of the results of this section
The ordered choice model (3) with stochastic thresholds that satisfy the stochastic mono-
tonicity condition (A-1), can be used to represent a variety of interesting economic choice
models. An essential feature of these models is that decisions about the choice of a state can
be made by comparing (expected) returns in the adjacent ordered states. In a model with
sequential information updating, this requires that one stage look ahead rules be optimal.
We next present conditions for the nonparametric identi¯cation of our generalization of the
ordered choice model.
18See the survey in Abbring and Heckman (2007).
233 Nonparametric Identi¯cation of the Generalized Or-
dered Choice Model
Assumption (A-1) is essential for the de¯nition of a coherent discrete choice model. In
general, (A-1) imposes restrictions on the dependence between the ´j and the Qj for j >
1. One cannot freely specify the cj, Qj and ´j without violating the assumption. The
dependence induced by (A-1) must be addressed in any proof of identi¯cation of the ordered
choice model.
It is easy to satisfy (A-1) in a variety of leading cases. Thus in the conventional ordered
choice model with ´j ´ 0, j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1 and with cj(Qj) = ¹ cj, the same constant
for all Qj, condition (A-1) is satis¯ed if the ¹ cj are properly ordered. Even if cj(Qj) is a
nontrivial function of Qj, (A-1) is satis¯ed, and the model is coherent if the restriction is
imposed in estimation. When cj(Qj) = ¹ cj, a constant, and ´j is general, (A-1) requires that
´j+1 + ¹ cj+1 ¸ ´j + ¹ cj for all j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1. When cj(Qj) is a nondegenerate function of
Qj and the ´j are nondegenerate, establishing nonparametric identi¯ability becomes more
di±cult, but is still possible. One case where (A-1) is satis¯ed and ´j, ´j+1 are independent of
Qj, Qj+1 occurs when ´j+1 ¸ ´j, j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1, almost everywhere and cj+1(Qj+1) > cj(Qj)
almost everywhere. This case is a strong form of the \no news is good news" assumption.
We ¯rst prove nonparametric identi¯cation under assumptions that cover all of these
cases. We denote the support of a variable as \Supp". We collect all of these cases into
assumption (A-7):
(A-7) For all j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, one of the following holds
i. ´j ´ 0, cj(Qj) = ¹ cj, ¹ cj+1 ¸ ¹ cj; or
ii. ´j ´ 0, cj+1(Qj+1) ¸ cj(Qj); or
iii. Pr(´j+1 ¸ ´j) = 1, cj(Qj) = ¹ cj, ¹ cj+1 ¸ ¹ cj; or
iv. Pr(´j+1 + ¹ cj+1 ¸ ´j + ¹ cj) = 1, ¹ cj+1 ¸ ¹ cj; or
24v. Pr(´j+1 ¸ ´j) = 1, cj+1(Qj+1) ¸ cj(Qj).
Clearly the ¯rst three cases are special versions of (iv) and (v). We distinguish them because
these simpler cases are likely to be used in applied work. For any of these cases, we prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that one of the conditions in (A-7) holds, and in addition,
i. The f´sg
¹ S¡1
s=1 are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure and have ¯nite
means, E(´1) = 0 (alternatively, the median or mode is zero), ´ ¹ S ´ 0; Supp(´s) µ
[´
s; ¹ ´s] and Supp(´) = Supp(´1;:::;´¹ S¡1) = Supp(´1) £ ¢¢¢ £ Supp(´¹ S¡1);
ii. ´j ? ? (Z;Q);
iii. Supp(´s) µ Supp('(Z) ¡ cs(Qs)) for each Q = q; s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1;
iv. (A-1), where c0(Q0) = ¡1; and c¹ S(Q¹ S) = 1 for all Q0 and Q¹ S;and ´¹ S = 0;
v. Supp(Q;Z) = Supp(Q1) £ ¢¢¢ £ Supp(Q¹ S¡1) £ Supp(Z);
vi. cs(Qs) = 0 at known Qs = ¹ qs, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1; ¹ qs is in the support of cs(Qs);
vii. '(Z), cs(Qs), s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, are members of the Matzkin class of functions (1992)
de¯ned in Appendix B (i.e., they satisfy one of the conditions 1{4 in that Appendix);
viii. UI ´ 0 (Normalization).
Then the '(Z), cs(Qs), s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, are identi¯ed over their supports and the
distributions of the ´j; F´j; j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1 are identi¯ed up to an unknown mean.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Matzkin's assumptions set the scale of the functions. One can weaken her assumptions
and obtain identi¯cation up to scale. If we relax (v), we can still identify components of '(Z)
and the cj(Qj), j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1, or the combined functions '(Z)¡cj(Qj), without identifying
25the individual components. Assumption (vi) and the normalization of the mean of ´1 set
the location parameters. The classical ordered choice model cj(Qj) ´ 0, j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1,
´1 = UI, follows as a trivial case of Theorem 2. The case of deterministic thresholds (´1 = UI
but cj(Qj) nontrivial functions of the Qj) follows as a separate case of the theorem. So does a
model with cj(Qj) = 0, j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1, and stochastic thresholds. (The ´j are nondegenerate
random variables with ´j+1 ¸ ´j, j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1.) The theorem also applies when ´j+1 ¸ ´j
and cj+1(Qj+1) ¸ cj(Qj), j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1, independently of each other. Under the alternative
set of assumptions embodied in (A-7), there is no contradiction between condition (ii) and
condition (A-1).
The model can be nonparametrically identi¯ed for more general cases that satisfy as-
sumption (A-1). We now produce a model where ´j and Qj are dependent and hence fail
assumption (ii) in Theorem 2, but the ordered choice model is nonparametrically identi¯ed.
It constructs the ´j from a hyperpopulation of latent random variables that in general do not
satisfy (A-1), but are sampled by a known rule to generate a population that satis¯es (A-1).
The population so generated represents an economic environment where cost shocks increase
at progressive stages. This could be associated with deteriorating skills or marketability or
rising direct and psychic costs of schooling with age. Since the sampling rule is known, it is
possible to account for it and establish identi¯cation.
Assume a hyperpopulation of latent random variables (´¤
j;Q¤
j), j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, where
the population of observed (´j;Qj) is generated by a recursive sampling rule from the hyper-















j) j = 2;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1:
No restrictions are imposed on (´¤
1;Q¤
1) by the sampling rule.
We assume that ´¤ = (´¤
1;:::;´¤
¹ S¡1) has mutually independent components and is inde-
26pendent of Q¤ = (Q¤
1;:::;Q¤
¹ S¡1) and Z.19 Letting \? ?" denote independence, we assume
that in the hyperpopulation,
(A-8) ´¤ ? ? (Q¤;Z).
As a consequence of (S) and (A-8), the density of ´2 given Q2 = q2 and Q1 = q1 is


















The dependence among the ´j and the Q arises from the sampling process (S).
The Qs, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, are assumed to be observed by the econometrician. As done
before, we can absorb UI into the ´j; alternatively, we set UI ´ 0. We now establish
nonparametric identi¯cation of this model. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we use many
standard assumptions from the discrete choice literature. We prove the following theorem
under assumption (S).




s=1 are mutually independent absolutely continuous random variables and have
¯nite means. Assume E(´¤
1) = 0. (Alternatively, the median or mode of ´1 is known.)
´¤
¹ S ´ 0; ´¤
s 2 [´¤
s; ¹ ´¤
s] for s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1;
ii. (A-8);
iii. Supp(´¤
s) µ Supp('(Z) ¡ cs(Q¤
s)) for s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1 for each Q¤
s = qs and for each
Z = z;
iv. Selection rule (S) holds;
19It is possible to relax the independence assumption, but it simpli¯es the analysis to maintain it. Sampled
´ are dependent.
27v. '(Z), cs(Q¤
s), s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, are members of the Matzkin class of functions (1992)
de¯ned in Appendix B (i.e., they satisfy one of the conditions 1{4 in that Appendix);
vi. Supp(Q¤;Z) = Supp(Q¤
1) £ ¢¢¢ £ Supp(Q¤
¹ S¡1) £ Supp(Z), s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1;
vii. cs(Qs) = 0 at known Qs = ¹ qs, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1; ¹ qs is in the support of cs(Qs);
viii. UI ´ 0 (normalization).
Then the '(Z), cs(Qs), s = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1 are identi¯ed over their supports and the distribu-
tions of the ´j; F´j, j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1 are identi¯ed as are the distributions F´¤
j, j = 1;:::; ¹ S¡1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Other assumptions about the arrival of new information rationalize the ordered choice
model and produce a model that can be nonparametrically identi¯ed. These assumptions
allow for some news to be good news, but not too good. One can generate the ´j from the
process
(11) ´j = ¡cj (Qj) + ´j¡1 + !j; ´0 = 0; c0 (Q0) = 0 and j > 1
where !j ¸ 0; j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡1 is a nonnegative random variable assumed to be independent
of Q and ´j¡1 and cj(Qj) ¸ cj¡1(Qj¡1), j = 2;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1. Array the !j into a vector !:
Assume for this process that
(A-9) (a) ! ? ? (Q;Z) and (b) !j ? ? !j0 8 j 6= j0; j;j0 = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1:
It is straightforward to establish identi¯cation of the model using the argument in Theorem 2.
E®ectively, this model replaces ´j with
Pj
`=1 !` and eliminates the cj(Qj) so that it is a
version of case (iii) of assumption (A-7). Generating the ´j in this fashion essentially removes
transition-speci¯c regressors from the model and hence we lose identi¯ability of cj(Qj). We
can identify the marginal distributions of the !j; j = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡1 by applying deconvolution
to speci¯cation (11) applied to the successive marginal distributions of the ´j.
284 Adjoining s-Speci¯c Outcomes
Associated with each choice s is an associated outcome vector Y (s;W). The outcomes can be
binary (e.g. employment indicators), continuous variables (present values), durations or any
combination of such variables.20 This includes the case where the Y (s;W) are, for example,
the net present values associated with each completed schooling level, Y (s;W) = R(s;W)
in the notation of Section 2. Write
Y (s;W) = ¹(s;W) + U (s), s = 1;:::; ¹ S;
where U(s) 2 [U(s); ¹ U(s)]. In addition to choice-speci¯c outcomes we may have access to a
vector of measurements M (W) that do not depend on s. We write
M (W) = ¹M (W) + UM,
where UM 2 [UM; ¹ UM]. We assume that E(U(s)) = 0, s = 1;:::; ¹ S, E (UM) = 0 and
(A-10) (Z;Q;W) ? ? (U(s);UM), s = 1;:::; ¹ S.
In this section, we allow for the possibility that W contains variables distinct from (Z;Q).
The analysis of Section 3 presents conditions for identifying the marginal distribution
of each ´s, s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1, up to scale. We can identify the marginal distribution of
the U(s) using the limit set arguments developed in Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003,
Theorem 3). Thus we can identify ¹(s;W), s = 1;:::; ¹ S, the marginal distributions of U (s),





using the analysis in their Theorem 3. They assume that it is possible to vary ¹M (W),
¹(s;W), '(Z) and cj (Qj) freely and attain a limit set that produces Pr(S = s j Z;Q) = 1.
To sketch their proof structure, note that from information on D(s) = 1;W;Y (s;W);Z;Q;
20We can develop the analysis for discrete components of outcomes using the analysis of Carneiro, Hansen
and Heckman (2003). They use latent variables crossing thresholds to generate the discrete variables and
identify the latent variables and their distribution up to an unknown scale.
29we can construct Pr(D(s) = 1 j W;Z;Q) and Pr(Y (s;W) · y(s;W);M (W) · m(x) j
D(s) = 1;W = w;Z = z). In this notation, the joint distribution of Y (s;W); M (W);D(s) =
1; s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1; given W = w; Z = z; and Q = q multiplied by the probability that





Y (s;W) · y(s;W)
M (W) · m(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
D(s) = 1;W = w;
Q = q;Z = z
1
C








fU(s);UM;´ (u(s);um;´1;:::;´s) d´s ¢¢¢d´1 dum dus;
where ¡ = f(´1;:::;´s) j ´1 +c1(q1)¡'(z) < ´2 +c2(q2)¡'(z) < ¢¢¢ < ´s +cs(qs)¡'(z)g.
We assume either (A-7) characterizes the model or condition (S), in which case we interpret
the ´j as ´¤
j in this section.
Assume that we can freely vary the arguments of this expression in the following sense:
(A-11) Supp(¹(s;W);¹m (W);'(Z) ¡ c1 (Q1);:::;'(Z) ¡ cs (Q¹ S¡1)) =
Supp(¹(s;W))£Supp(¹m (W))£Supp('(Z) ¡ c1 (Q1))£¢¢¢£Supp('(Z) ¡ c¹ S¡1 (Q¹ S¡1))














£Supp(UM)£Supp(´1)£¢¢¢£Supp(´¹ S¡1), where this
condition applies to all components.
Assumptions (A-10), (A-11) and (A-12), coupled with the assumptions used in either Theo-
rem 2 or Theorem 3, along with the requirement that there are no restrictions on the support

















. The proof is a straightforward extension of proofs in the
30published literature.21 For the sake of brevity, it is deleted.
From the limit sets that drive Pr(D(s) = 1jZ = z;Q = q) to 1, s = 1;:::; ¹ S, one can
identify the average treatment e®ects across di®erent outcome states E(Y (s) ¡ Y (s0) j W).
The marginal treatment e®ects for transitions (s;s + 1);s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1 can be identi¯ed
by applying the local instrumental variable method following Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil
(2006b), or Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) or directly by using the argument of Carneiro,
Hansen and Heckman (2003). The parameters Treatment on the Treated or Treatment
on the Untreated require information on the joint distributions of random variables like
(U (`);´1;:::;´¹ S¡1).22
If we use the model based on independent latent censored variables as described in con-
dition (S), we can identify the joint density of the ´ = (´1;:::;´¹ S¡1) under the conditions
of Theorem 3. We can identify the scales and all of the marginal densities, given the nor-
malizations for the ´, using the limit set argument. We can identify the joint distributions
of (U (s);´s) for each outcome state; s = 1;:::; ¹ S ¡ 1; by setting cs¡1 (Qs¡1) ! ´
s¡1 and
cs+1 (Qs+1) ! ¹ ´s. These joint distributions do not contain the information required to form
the full joint distribution of (U(s);´1;:::;´s).23
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the economic foundations of ordered discrete choice models. The clas-
sical ordered discrete choice model is generalized to accommodate stochastic thresholds and
associated outcome variables. We develop conditions for nonparametric identi¯cation. We
21See Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) and Heckman and Navarro (2007).
22See the discussion in Heckman and Navarro (2007).
23Under a factor structure assumption and under conditions speci¯ed in Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman
(2003) and Heckman and Navarro (2007), we can identify the factor loadings as well as distribution of the fac-
tors and uniquenesses from data on Y (s;W); for each s = 1;:::; ¹ S; and any associated measurements M (W).
If we assume a factor model for the choice process and a corresponding structure for measurements and out-
comes, then we can identify the covariances between U (s) and (´1;:::;´s): This requires a restriction on the
dimension of the admissible factors. Under the factor structure assumption and with suitable restrictions








From this information, and the parameters previously identi¯ed, we can form all of the desired counterfac-
tuals, applying the analysis of Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) and Heckman and Navarro (2007).
31discuss classes of interesting economic models that can be represented by the generalized
ordered choice model. We also develop restrictions on information processing and the arrival
of new information that are required to justify the application of the generalized ordered
choice model to adequately represent dynamic discrete choice models.
There are two key requirements for the model. The ¯rst is that local comparisons between
the rewards of adjacent states locate the global optimum. In a deterministic setting, this
is justi¯ed by global concavity, where the unobservables respect a stochastic monotonicity
condition. In an environment of uncertainty, assumptions that produce a monotone optimal
stopping condition justify a naive one-step-ahead forecasting rule as a way of characterizing
optimal policies. The local comparisons used in the ordered choice model contrast with
more general choice frameworks, which rely on global comparisons. A second requirement
is separability between observables and unobservables. We conjecture that it is possible to
relax separability, but we leave the analysis for another occasion.24 Separability is a hallmark
feature of the classical ordered choice model and we maintain it for the sake of familiarity
and ease of analysis.
Address correspondence to: James Heckman, University of Chicago, Department of Eco-
nomics, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA; Tel.: +1-773-702-0634, Fax: +1-
773-702-8490, E-mail: jjh@uchicago.edu. Also a±liated with the American Bar Foundation
and University College, Dublin. Flavio Cunha is at the University of Pennsylvania, De-
partment of Economics, 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104,
USA, E-mail: °aviocunha@gmail.com. Salvador Navarro is at the University of Wisconsin{
Madison, Department of Economics, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA,
E-mail: snavarro@ssc.wisc.edu.
24Cameron and Heckman (1998) relax separability in one version of the ordered choice model. See also
Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003).
32Appendix
A Proofs of Theorems and Propositions
Proof of Proposition (2)
Proof. We show that this is true by backward induction. Consider an individual with ability
level a. We want to calculate the value function when the schooling level is s > s¤ (a): We
¯rst derive the value functions for the last period t = T: Note that
V (T;s; ¹ xs;T;a) = maxf®(s;a) + °xs;T + ¢r0 (T;s;xs;T);± (s;a) + ¢r1 (T;s)g (AP.1)
= ®(s;a) + °xs;T + ¢r0 (T;s;xs;T):
So the proposition is true for t = T: Note that the value function at period T of a person
who is working, with schooling s, until period T ¡1 and decides to return to school at period
T ¡ 1 is
V (T;s + 1; ¹ xs;T;a) = maxf®(s + 1;a) + ¢r0 (T;s;xs;T);± (s;a) + ¢r1 (T;s)g (AP.2)
= ®(s + 1;a) + ¢r0 (T;s;xs;T).
Next we show that the proposition is also true for period T ¡1: Note that xs;T = xs;T¡1 +1
if the agent decides to work in period T ¡ 1: In period T ¡ 1; the problem of the agent is
(AP.3)




®(s;a) + °xs;T¡1 + ¢r0 (T ¡ 1;s;xs;T¡1) + ¯ET¡1 [V (T;s; ¹ xs;T;a)];





33If we substitute (AP.1) and (AP.2) into (AP.3), we conclude that the agent decides not to
enroll in school in period T ¡ 1 if, and only if
®(s;a) + ° (1 + ¯)xs;T¡1 + ¢r0 (T ¡ 1;s;xs;T¡1) + ¯®(s;a) + ¯° ¸
± (s;a) + ¢r1 (T ¡ 1;s) + ¯®(s + 1;a),
which is guaranteed by Proposition 1 for any schooling level s > s¤ (a): Consequently,





¿¡T+1E [r0 (¿;s;xs;T¡1 + ¿ ¡ T + 1;a) j s;x¿;a] + ¢r0(T ¡ 1;s;xs;T¡1).
We now show that the proposition also holds for the value function V (T ¡ 1;s + 1; ¹ xs;T¡2;a):
This is the value function of an agent who until period T ¡ 2 was working at school level s,
but at the beginning of period T ¡ 2 decides to go back to school. De¯ne zT as the vector
of length ¹ S that describes the experience of this agent, who works at period T ¡ 1 with
schooling s + 1:
zT = (0;:::;xs;T¡2;1;:::;0).
The value function V (T ¡ 1;s + 1; ¹ xs;T¡2;a) satis¯es




®(s + 1;a) + ¢r0 (T ¡ 1;s + 1;0) + ¯ET¡1 [V (T;s + 1;zT;a)];





Now, it can be shown that
ET¡1 [V (T;s + 1;zT;a)] = ®(s + 1;a) + °
and
ET¡1 [V (T;s + 2; ¹ xs;T¡2;a)] = ®(s + 2;a).
34Consequently, the agent does not enroll in school if and only if
®(s + 1;a) + ¢r0 (T ¡ 1;s + 1;0) + ¯®(s + 1;a) + ¯° ¸
± (s + 1;a) + ¢r1 (T ¡ 1;s) + ¯®(s + 2;a).
Note that by Proposition 1, this inequality is always true for any schooling level s ¸ s¤ (a):
Therefore (7) is true for V (T ¡ 1;s + 1; ¹ xs;T¡2;a):
We seek to prove that the proposition is true for a generic period t; schooling level s; and




> > > > <
> > > > :
xj;t if j < s
xj;t + 1 if j = s
0 if j > s
:
Note that if the agent decides to work, his next period experience will be denoted by xt+1:
If he decides not to work, then his experience vector is summarized by xt:
To continue with the proof by backward induction, we assume that the claim is true for
the value functions V (t + 1;s;xt+1;a) and V (t + 1;s + 1;xt;a): From the de¯nition of the
Bellman equation,




®(s;a) + ¢r0 (t;s;xs;t) + ¯E [V (t + 1;s;xt+1;a)js;xt;a];










®(s;a) + ¢r0 (t;s;xs;t) + ¯
PT
¿=t+1 ¯¿¡t¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ (t + 1) + xs;t + 1)];
± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s) + ¯
PT





Note that the agent decides not to enroll if and only if




¿¡t¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ (t + 1) + xs;t + 1)]




¿¡t¡1 [®(s + 1;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t ¡ 1)]:
This inequality reduces to









[®(s + 1;a) ¡ ®(s;a)],





¿¡t [®(s;a) + ° (xs;t + ¿ ¡ t)] + ¢r0 (t;s;0):
Proof of Proposition (3)
Proof. Again, by backward induction. Note that from Proposition (2), we conclude that
Corollary (1) of Proposition (2), it is also true for V (t;s¤ (a);0;a). Next, we assume that
(8) is true in period t0 + 1 with schooling level s + 1, such that s¤ (a) = s + k (a) ¡ 1, where
k(a) is a nonnegative integer, experience vector xt0+1 = 0; and ability level is a and show that






®(s;a) + ¢r0 (t0;s;0) + ¯Et0 [V (t0 + 1;s;xt0+1;a)];









0 if j 6= s
1 if j = s
:
Again, suppose that the agent does not enroll in school at period t0 and starts working with
schooling s. We next investigate whether he ever returns to school again, perhaps at period





0 if j 6= s
p if j = s; for p = 1;:::;T ¡ t0
:







®(s;a) + °p + ¢r0 (t0 + p;s;xs;t0+p) + ¯Et0+p [V (t0 + p + 1;s;xt0+p+1;a)],





Note that the agent has accumulated experience only at schooling level s. Because s-
speci¯c experience is not useful in sector s0 6= s,
V (t
0 + p + 1;s + 1;xt0+p;a) = V (t
0 + p + 1;s + 1;0;a):
The agent does not enroll in school again at period t0 + p if, and only if
(AP.4)
®(s;a) + °p ¡ ± (s;a) + ¢r0 (t0 + p;s;xs;t0+p) ¡ ¢r1 (t0 + p;s)
¸ ¯Et0+p [V (t0 + p + 1;s + 1;0;a) ¡ V (t0 + p + 1;s;xt0+p+1;a)]:
Note that the right-hand side of this equation is the expectation of the di®erence of two value
functions. We assume that the proposition is true for the ¯rst value function, V (t0 + p +
1;s+1;0;a), propose a lower bound for the second value function, V (t0+p+1;s;xt0+p+1;a),
and show that it is not optimal to return to school at period t0 + p.








l=1 ¯l¡1± (s + l;a) + ¢r1 (t0 + p;s) + ¯n+
PT





37Assuming that the proposition is true for period t0 + p + 1 and schooling level s + 1, we can
write
V (t
0 + p + 1;s + 1;0;a)
= max
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¢r0 (t0 + p + 1;s + 1;0) +
PT
¿=t0+p+1 ¯¿¡t0¡p¡1 [®(s + 1;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t0 ¡ p ¡ 1)];
Pn¤¡1
l=1 ¯l¡1± (s + l;a) + ¢r1 (t0 + p;s)
+¯n¤ PT
¿=t0+p+n¤ ¯¿¡t0¡p¡n¤ [®(s + n¤;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t0 ¡ p ¡ n¤)]
9
> > > > =




0 + p + 1;s + 1;0;a) (AP.5)
= ¢r0 (t




¿¡t0¡p¡1 [®(s + 1;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t
0 ¡ p ¡ 1)]:
Then the agent does not enroll in school in period t0 +p. To see why, note that we have the
following bound:
(AP.6) Et0+p [V (t




¿¡t0¡p¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t)]:
Now, if (AP.5) is true, we can bound the di®erence:
Et0+p [V (t0 + p + 1;s + 1;0;a) ¡ V (t0 + p + 1;s;xt0+1;a)]
·
PT
¿=t+p+1 ¯¿¡t0¡p¡1 [®(s + 1;a) ¡ ®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t)] · 0,
where the last inequality is guaranteed by (A-5). Because of Condition (G) of (A-4), we can
also bound the di®erence:
®(s;a) + °p ¡ ± (s;a) + ¢r0 (t
0 + p;s;0) ¡ ¢r1 (t
0 + p;s) ¸ 0:
Thus, under (AP.5), inequality (AP.4) holds and it is not optimal to return to school. Now,
38suppose that
V (t





l¡1± (s + l;a) + ¢r1 (t







¤;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t
0 ¡ p ¡ n
¤)]:
Again, we can use (AP.6) to claim that
Et0+p [V (t











[®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t)]:







¤;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t




















¤;a) ¡ ®(s;a) ¡ ° (p + n
¤)] · 0:
So the gross returns to going back to school are negative. On the other hand, note that the
gross costs are positive:
®(s;a) ¡ ± (s;a) + °p + ¢r0 (t
0 + p;s;0) ¡ ¢r1 (t





l¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t) ¡ ± (s + l;a)]
= f®(s;a) ¡ ± (s;a) + °p + ¢r0 (t

















l¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t) ¡ ®(s + l;a)]
)
¸ 0:
Note that because of Condition (G) of (A-4), the ¯rst term (in braces) in the ¯nal expression
39before the inequality is nonnegative. The second term is nonnegative because of condition
(F) of (A-4). The third part is nonnegative because of (A-5). Consequently, if the agent
drops out of school at period t0 with school level s; he will never return. This implies that





0 if j 6= s
p if j = s
for p = 1;:::;T ¡ t
0:
The value function V (t0 + p;s;xt0+p;a) satis¯es
V (t





¿¡t0¡p¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t
0)].
In particular, note that
(AP.7)
V (t





¿¡t0¡1 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t
0 + 1)].
This is important because by de¯nition of the Bellman equation,
V (t




®(s + 1;a) + ¢r0 (t0 + 1;s + 1;0) + ¯Et0 [V (t0 + 2;s;xt0+2;a)];





Thus, we can write
V (t





®(s;a) + ¢r0 (t0 + 1;s;xs;t0+1) + ¯
PT
¿=t0+2 ¯¿¡t0¡2 [®(s;a) + ° (¿ ¡ t0 ¡ 1)];





and by substituting the equality (AP.7) sequentially, we conclude that (8) is true for all
s · s¤ (a) as we sought to prove.
40Proof of Proposition (5)
Proof. To prove the claim we must show that an agent who decides to drop out at period t
with schooling level s would also choose to remain out of school at school level s+k. To see
why, consider the one stage look ahead rule
maxfR(t;s;0;a);± (s;a) + ¢r1 (t;s;0) + ¯Et [R(t + 1;s + 1;0;a)]g.
Suppose that the agent decides to drop out of school. Then, it must be true that
®(s;a) + ¢r0 (s;s;0) ¡ ± (s;a) ¡ ¢r1 (s;s;0) ¸ ¯
1 ¡ ¯T¡s
1 ¡ ¯
[®(s + 1;a) ¡ ®(s;a) ¡ °].
Now, suppose that the agent faces the same choice at some school level s + k; k ¸ 1: Then,
the agent would still drop out of school if and only if
®(s + k;a)+¢r0 (s + k;s;0)¡± (s + k;a)¡¢r1 (s;s;0) ¸ ¯
1 ¡ ¯T¡s¡k
1 ¡ ¯
[®(s + 1;a) ¡ ®(s;a) ¡ °].
Note that it is always true that, for all nonnegative integers k,
[®(s + k;a) ¡ ®(s;a) ¡ °] ¸ [®(s + k;a) ¡ ®(s;a) ¡ °].
So, if we know that
®(s + k;a) ¡ ± (s + k;a) ¸
1 ¡ ¯T¡s¡k
1 ¡ ¯T¡s (®(s;a) ¡ ± (s;a))
and
¢r0 (s + k;s + k;0) ¡ ¢r1 (s + k;s + k;0) ¸
1 ¡ ¯T¡s¡k
1 ¡ ¯T¡s ¢r0 (s;s;0) ¡ ¢r1 (s;s;0),
41then we know that the agent would still decide to drop out of school. But these inequalities
are guaranteed by Condition (8).
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Normalize UI = 0 (alternatively absorb it into the ´j). From the assumptions,
Pr(D(1) = 1 j Z = z;Q = q) = Pr('(z) ¡ c1(q1) · ´1):
Using Matzkin's (1992) extension of Manski (1988), for the class of functions for '(Z) and
c1(Q1) de¯ned by Matzkin (1992), we invoke assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) to identify F´1 up
to an unknown mean and '(Z) ¡ c1(Q1) over its support. From (vii) we can separately
identify '(Z) and c1(Q1) up to constants. From (i) and (vi) we can pin down the constants
in '(Z) given that ¹ q1 is in Supp(Q1) by assumption (vi) since we ¯x the location of ´1 by
(i). Next consider the event D(1) + D(2) = 1 given Q = q;Z = z. This can be written
as Pr(D(1) + D(2) = 1 j Z = z;Q = q) = Pr('(z) ¡ c2(q2) · ´2). We can repeat the
argument made for Pr(D(1) = 1 j Z;Q) for this probability. Alternatively, we can vary '(Z)
and identify the distribution of ´2 + c2(q2). ¹ q2 is in Supp(Q2) from assumption (vi). We
can identify the distribution of ´2 up to an unknown location parameter. We can identify
the location parameter since we know the constant in '(Z). Proceeding in this fashion for
Pr(D(1) + D(2) + D(3) = 1 j Z = z;Q = q) and successive probabilities of this type, we
establish identi¯ability of the model.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Instead of normalizing UI = 0, we can absorb it into the de¯nition of ´j. From the
assumptions,
Pr(D(1) = 1 j Z = z;Q1 = q1) = Pr('(z) ¡ c1(q1) · ´1):
42Condition (A-1) and sampling rule (S) impose no restriction on (Q¤
1;´¤
1). Using Matzkin's
extension of Manski (1988) and the Matzkin class of functions, we invoke conditions (i),
(ii), (iii), (v) and (vi), we identify F´1 up to its mean (= 0), the '(Z) and the c1(Q1).
The constants in '(Z) and c1(Q1) cannot be separated without the information provided by
assumption (vii).
Proceeding sequentially, consider the event D(1) + D(2) = 1, given Z = z, Q2 = q2,
Q1 = q1. Its probability can be written as Pr(D(1)+D(2) = 1 j Z = z;Q2 = q2;Q1 = q1) =
Pr('(z) ¡ c2(q2) · ´2 j Q2 = q2;Q1 = q1). Absorb c2(q2) into ´2: ~ ´2 = ´2 + c2(q2). Since
we know '(Z) from the ¯rst step of the proof, under (vi), we can identify F~ ´2. At the point
of evaluation q2 = ¹ q2, c2(q2) = 0. We thus obtain the distribution of ´2 and its density as a
consequence of (i).















we can identify K(¹ q2;q1) for each q1 and hence we can identify f´¤
2(´2) over the full support
of ´2.
To recover c2(q2), invoke (iii). Then there exists a limit set S(limQ1) such that
Pr(D(1) + D(2) = 1 j Z = z;Q1 = q1;Q2 = q2;Q1 2 S(limQ1))
= Pr(D(2) = 1 j Z = z;Q1 = q1;Q2 = q2;Q1 2 S(limQ1))
= Pr('(Z) ¡ c2(q2) · ´2):




Pr(D(1) = 1 j Z = z;Q1 = q1;Q2 = q2;Q1 2 S(limQ1)) = 0:
Proceeding sequentially, we establish the claim in Theorem 3.
B The Matzkin Class of Functions
Consider a binary choice model, D = 1('(Z) > V ), where Z is observed and V is unobserved.
Let '¤ denote the true ' and let F ¤
V denote the true cdf of V . Let z 2 Z: Let ¡ denote the set
of monotone increasing functions from < into [0;1]. Matzkin (1992) establishes conditions
for identi¯ability of '(Z).
She shows that the following alternative representations of functional forms satisfying
the conditions for exact identi¯cation for '(Z). We refer to these as the Matzkin class of
functions in the text.
1. '(Z) = Z°, k°k = 1 or °1 = 1, or
2. '(Z) is homogeneous of degree one and attains a given value ®, at Z = z¤ (e.g. cost
functions where ® = 0 when Z = 0), or
3. the '(Z) is a member of a class of least-concave function that attains common values
at two points in their domain, or
4. additively separable function, for '(Z):
(a) functions additively separable into a continuous and monotone increasing function
and a continuous monotone increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one
function;
(b) functions additively separable into the value of one variable and a continuous,
monotone increasing function of the remaining variables;
44(c) a set of additively separable functions (see Matzkin, 1992, example 5, p.255).
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